Features
Strategic Ramifications Of The Egyptian Unrest
The prospect of an imminent, uncontrolled change in the leadership of Egypt, or other political paralysis in the state, as a result of growing popular unrest which began in the country in earnest on January 25, 2011, has clear strategic ramifications, dependent on how the matter resolves itself.
By January 30, 2011, the key to the transition of power in Egypt was the Army. The domestic intelligence service under the Interior Ministry had failed to anticipate, or deal with, the crisis; the foreign intelligence service, from which the new Vice-President emerged, lacks a power base. So, as the matter progressed, only the Army could maintain stability.
President Hosni Mubarak’s health is now so poor that it was considered surprising that he did not take steps in 2009 to begin a transition of power, but his son and named heir, Gamal, himself had developed no meaningful power base other than in certain financial and political sectors. That “base” provided no power in the context of popular discontent.
President Hosni Mubarak, 82, on Saturday, January 29, 2011, dismissed his entire Cabinet, but it was likely that Defense Minister Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawy Soliman, 75, will be called back into a new Cabinet, given the fact that he has effectively managed the Armed Forces as head of the Operations Authority (effectively head of the Army and joint services) and, since 1993, as Defense Minister. Field Marshal Tantawy is solid, discreet, modest, and has a strongly loyal following within the military. He had also been Commander of the Presidential Guard, Minister for Defense Production, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (1991). Many in the military consider that he should have acted earlier to cause President Mubarak to retire, and to put a stop to the President’s belief that he could make his son, Gamal Mubarak, 47, into a leader to succeed to the Presidency.
The fact that the President, on Friday, January 28, 2011, called on the Armed Forces to essentially replace the Police and the Security Police essentially put Field Marshal Tantawy in command of the situation. The rivalry between the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry — which controls the General Directorate for State Security (the Security Policy, a national paramilitary gendarmerie) — has been endemic in Egypt for decades. The Interior Ministry manifestly failed to anticipate the level of frustration throughout Egyptian society, and neither did it plan an effective response to any large-scale unrest.
The Armed Forces under the legendary then-Defense Minister, Field Marshal Mohamed Abdel-Halim Abu-Ghazala, during the Anwar as-Sadat Presidency (1970-1981) and later, were used to put down a mutiny, in February 1986, by 17,000 Security Police. A colleague and friend of this writer (and the likes of US Secretary of State Alexander Haig) from 1974 until his death on September 6, 2008, Field Marshal Abu-Ghazala was awarded the International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA) Gold Star Award for Outstanding Contributions to Strategic Progress in 1986. Abu-Ghazala, like his friend, Field Marshal Tantawy, was seen as a Presidential contender, but both of them chose — for the sake of stability in Egypt — not to challenge Mubarak’s lackluster Presidency.
The measure of President Mubarak’s understanding that Egypt is moving rapidly toward political transition came when he named, on January 29, 2011, a Vice-President, the first he has appointed since he took office in 1981. He had promised the post to then-Defense Minister Abu-Ghazala, and later it was reported he would offer it to current Defense Minister Tantawy. But Mubarak was full of fear that he might be removed and succeeded.
Now he has named Omar Suleiman, the chief of the Mukhabarat el-Aama — the general intelligence and security service, responsible for foreign intelligence — to the Vice-Presidency. He also named retired Air Chief Marshal and former Air Force commander and head of civil aviation Ahmed Shafik, 69, as prime minister, replacing Ahmed Nazif, who had been Prime Minister since 2004, and who was forced to resign with the entire Cabinet during the current unrest.
One commentator remarked, after the start of the rioting in Egypt on January 25, 2011, that “repression” of Egyptian society was not the reason for popular unrest, but rather the frustration was finally boiling over because Mubarak failed to offer Egyptians “a dream”. What was remarkable about President Mubarak’s tenure was his absolute failure to project any personal charisma or to paint a “dream” for the Egyptian people, in stark contrast to his predecessor, Anwar as-Sadat, whose 1978 autobiography, In Search of Identity, expressly outlined to the Egyptian people who they were, and what they sought.
In the Preface to the Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook on Egypt, in 1995, I noted: “If Egypt remains strong, and in all senses a ‘power’ in its regional contexts, then world events will move in one direction. If Egypt’s strength is undermined, then world events (and not merely those of the Middle East) will move along a far more uncertain and violent path.”
It is significant that Egypt began to fail to be “strong”, internally, within a few years of that 1995 book. It became less resilient as President Mubarak became more isolated and the inspiration offered by Sadat began to erode. This resulted in the rise in Egypt of the Islamists who had killed Sadat, and the growing empowerment of the veteran Islamists from the Afghan conflict, including such figures as Osama bid Laden (who had spent considerable time living in Egypt), and Ayman al-Zawahiri, et al.
The reality was that Mubarak’s management-style Presidency could not offer the requisite hope — because “hope” translates to meaning and identity — to Egyptian society as it was transitioning from poverty and unemployment to gradually growing wealth. Hope equates to patience.
What are the areas of strategic concern, then, as Egypt transforms? The following are some considerations:
1. Security and stability of Suez Canal sea traffic: Even temporary disruption, or the threat of disruptions, to traffic through the Suez Canal would disturb global trade, given that the Canal and the associated SUMED pipeline (which takes crude oil north from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean) are responsible for significant volumes of world trade, including energy shipments. Threats of delays or closure of the Canal and/or the SUMED, or hints of increased danger to shipping, would significantly increase insurance costs on trade, and would begin to have shippers consider moving Suez traffic, once again, to the longer and more expensive Cape of Good Hope seaway.
2. Disruption of Nile waters negotiations and matters relating: Egypt’s support for the emerging independence of South Sudan was based on that new state’s control over a considerable stretch of the White Nile, at a time when Egypt has been attempting to dominate new treaty discussions regarding Nile (White and Blue Nile) water usage and riparian rights. Already, Egyptian ability to negotiate with the Nile River states has entered an hiatus, and unless the Egyptian Government is able to re-form quickly around a strong, regionally-focused model, Egypt will have lost all momentum on securing what it feels is its dominance over Nile water controls. In the short term, the Egyptian situation could provide tremors into northern and South Sudan, and in South Sudan this will mean that the US, in particular, could be asked to step up support activities to that country’s independence transition.
Such a sudden loss of Egypt’s Nile position will radically affect its long-standing proxy “war” to keep Ethiopia — which controls the headwaters and flow of the Blue Nile, the Nile’s biggest volume input — landlocked and strategically impotent. This means that Egypt’s ability to block African Union (AU) and Arab League denial of sovereignty recognition of the Republic of Somaliland will decline or disappear for the time being. Already Egypt’s influence enabled an Islamist take-over of Somaliland, possibly moving that state toward re-integration with the anomic Somalia state. Equally importantly, the interregnum in Egypt will mean a cessation of Cairo’s support for Eritrea and the proxy war which Eritrea facilitates — but which others, particularly Egypt, pay — against Ethiopia through the arming, logistics, training, etc., of anti-Ethiopian groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), etc.
3. Overall security of the Red Sea states and SLOC: Egypt has been vital to sustaining the tenuous viability of the state of Eritrea, because Cairo regarded Eritrean loyalty as a key means of sustaining Egyptian power projection into the Red Sea (and ensuring the security of the Red Sea/Suez Sea Lane of Communication), and to deny such access to Israel. Absent Egyptian support, the Eritrean Government of Pres. Isayas Afewerke will begin to feel its isolation and economic deprivation, and may well, on its own, accelerate new pressures for conflict with Ethiopia to distract local populations from the growing deprivation in the country.
4. The Israel situation: A protracted interregnum in Egypt, or a move by Egypt toward Islamist or populist governance could bring about a decline in the stability of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement, and provide an opening of the border with the HAMAS-controlled Gaza region of the Palestinian Authority lands. This would contribute to the ability of Iran to escalate pressures on Israel, and not only further isolate Israel, but also isolate Jordan, and, to an extent, Saudi Arabia. The threat of direct military engagement between Israel and Egypt may remain low, but a move by Egypt away from being a predictable part of the regional peace system would, by default, accelerate the growth of the Iran-Syria-HizbAllah-HAMAS ability to strategically threaten Israel. Moreover, the transforming situation would also inhibit the West Bank Palestinian Authority Government.
5. Eastern Mediterranean stability: The instability, and the possible move toward greater Islamist influence, in Egypt reinforces the direction — and potential for control of the regional agenda — by the Islamist Government of Turkey. It is certainly possible that the transformed mood of the Eastern Mediterranean could inhibit external investment in the development of the major gas fields off the Israeli and Cyprus coasts. This may be a gradual process, but the overall sense of the stability of the region — particularly if Suez Canal closure or de facto closure by any avoidance of it by shippers due to an Islamist government in Cairo — would be jeopardized if the area is no longer the world’s most important trade route.
6. Influence on Iran’s position: It should be considered that any decline in Egypt’s ability to act as the major influence on the Arab world enhances Iran’s de facto position of authority in the Greater Middle East. It is true that Egypt’s position has been in decline in this regard for the past decade and more, and that even Saudi Arabia has worked, successfully to a degree, to compete with Egypt for regional (ie: Arab) leadership. Without strong Egyptian leadership, however, there is no real counterweight to Iran’s ability to intimidate. During the period of the Shah’s leadership in Iran (until the “revolution” of 1979 and the Shah’s departure, ultimately to his death and burial, ironically, in Cairo), Iran and Egypt were highly compatible strategic partners, stabilising the region to a large degree. The Shah’s first wife was Egyptian. Absent a strong Egypt (and, in reality, we have been “absent a strong Egypt” for some years), we can expect growing Iranian boldness in supporting such groups as those fighting for the so-called “Islamic Republic of Eastern Arabia”.
7. US interests: A stable Egypt is critical for the maintenance of US strategic interests, given its control of the Suez; its partnership in the peace process with Israel; and so on. Why, then, would the current US Barack Obama Administration indicate that it would “support the masses” in the streets of Egyptian cities at this point. There is no question that Washington has supported moves to get President Mubarak to provide for a smooth succession over recent years: that would have been beneficial for Egypt as well as for the US. But for the US to actively now support — as Barack Obama has done — “the street” over orderly transition of power lacks strategic sense. It is true that the State Dept., and even the strategically-challenged US Vice-President, Joe Biden, have urged caution on the Egyptian people, but President Obama has effectively contradicted that approach, as he did in Tunisia, where he literally supported the street revolution against its President earlier in January 2011. If Egypt moves to anti-Western, anti-US governance, the US will be required to re-think its entire strategic approach to the Middle East, Africa, and the projection of power through the Eastern Mediterranean and into the Indian Ocean. It would give a strong boost of importance to the US Pacific Fleet, which is responsible for US projection the Indian Ocean. CENTCOM (Central Command) would need to be re-thought, as would USAFRICOM (US African Command).
8. Impact on the US positions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan: The “loss” of Egypt and the questionable ability which the US could have over projection through the Suez Canal — if it came to that — would certainly impact US ability to support the final military operations it has in Iraq, and Afghanistan. A loss (or jeopardizing) of US military access via Egyptian-controlled areas such as the Red Sea/Suez would absolutely fragment the way in which the US can project power globally. Even the accession of an Islamist state in Egypt, as opposed to closure of the Suez Canal, would achieve much of this. What is clear is that the US did not adequately prepare for the end of the Mubarak era, even though it was absolutely obvious that it was coming. Now, only by luck will the US see the Egyptian Armed Forces reassert control over Egypt and introduce a new generation of leadership to bridge the transition until the re-emergence of a charismatic leader.
9. Concern over governance transition in “republican dynasties”: The recent street moves against states with protracted – ie: essentially against normal constitutional viability – power being held by autocratic leaders over long periods has become a clear message that Western democracies succeed by arranging orderly transitions of power, whether among their constitutional monarchs as heads-of-state, or among their elected governments. States which rise and fall with each successive and uneasy – often violent – transfer of power from one leader to the next, or in which autocrats attempt to impose their children as their successors without the legitimacy of a nationally-evolved monarchy or tradition, are in increasing peril as to their long-term stability. Syria, for example, in the region continues to founder although it achieved the transfer of one Assad to the next, but it does not prosper. Libya, Algeria, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, and North Korea, for example, all must consider that extended governance without legitimate options for the future encourages decline and instability.
10. Issues of Military Technology and Equipment Relations: Any move by Egypt away from its pro-US position – including, and particularly, the prospect of an administration headed by self-styled “opposition leader” Mohamed Elbaradei, would result in a major compromise of US military technology. The Egyptian Armed Forces have a major defense supply relationship with the US, particularly with high-profile systems such as late-model Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block 50/52 fighters, M1A1 main battle tanks, AH-64A/D Apache and Apache Longbow attack helicopters, UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, a wide range of surface- and air-mounted missile systems, and so on. The reality is that further north in the Mediterranean, the defense supply relationship with Turkey is already compromised, by the US Government will not recognize that. Firstly, the supply relationship with Turkey means that the technology itself may be compromised to other states (Iran, Russia), to some extent, and now will almost certainly not be used to support US/NATO initiatives. In Egypt, a similar situation could prevail if the Armed Forces do not take control and exclude Elbaradei and/or other anti-US Islamists or populists.
Pres. Gamal Abdel Nasser was charismatic and transformative, but not necessarily a leader who delivered a strong new architecture to Egypt. Anwar as-Sadat gradually emerged as charismatic, and he was transformative in a very meaningful way for the country.
It took three decades of Mubarak’s invisible presence for so much of Sadat’s vision to erode, and yet Sadat’s national architecture remains intact if someone would be able to pick up the reins of real leadership. What is significant is that the Egyptian Royal Family has not re-emerged from exile to offer some hope of a restoration of traditional Egyptian values.
If the populist and vehemently anti-US ally of Iran, Mohamed Elbaradei, seizes control of the Egyptian mob — because that is his goal: to position himself at the front of a mob not of his own making — he would certainly re-introduce a great element of instability to the region, and bolster Iran’s position.
Even without directly working with Iran, merely by pushing Egypt into an investment-averse situation, Iran’s regional power would grow, and Egypt would be under the grip of a vain and shallow man far more detrimental to the nation’s long-term interests even than Mubarak the Manager. Not insignificantly, when US left-leaning television news network CNN interviewed – and essentially played softly with – Elbaradei, the former UN official was wearing a green tie, meant to be a clear signal to Iran and the Islamists.
There are other populist factors to consider, including the prospect of a junior- or mid-level officer putsch in the style of the Free Officers Movement which propelled Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, its founder (after first putting up a staging horse, Gen. Muhammad Naguib, into office as a figurehead), to power in 1952, launching the system which is now under pressure with the decline of Mubarak.
There are many more factors to consider, but these are a few on which thinking should focus.
Analysis by Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, USA.
Gregory R. Copley
From the fore going, the fight against drug trafficking should be treated as an international challenge with open collaboration, if the world leadership must win the fight!.
The circumstances or should I say the improvement on drug related activities are modifying and updating on daily basis. A close friend of mine in the United States of America who recently visited Jamaica, came with a lot of complicated information about drug trafficking and transaction. Being a qualified Nurse in US and on a visit to the Reggae Country (Jamaica), she said she was put aback when a man approached her and introduced himself as a Pharmacist. According to her, she immediately picked interest due to her professional background. To her, a business partner is birthed. But she was shocked to the narrows on learning that drug dealers or traffickers and subriquited Pharmacist in that Country. From her account, they ( The Jamaican Pharmacists), are the first set to people to meet and greet you at the Airport. No government or authority challenges them in the open due to the sophisticated nature of their transportation
Come to think of it, who would want to attack a Pharmacist on duty? Nigerians are not left out in the improvement on drug deal. A chat with a confident in the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency ( NDLEA) Rivers State Command, so revealed. The Officer draw my attention to the movement of Dispatch Riders. He said part of the reasons they ride with almost speed equivalent of the thunder lightning, is to meet up with the appointment of delivering hard drug consignment to a client of theirs. According to him, those guys popularly referred to as Yahoo Boys are the ones who now payroll dispatch riders so that they can deliver their consignment ( hard drugs) on schedule no matter the sort of traffic or weather condition. The fear of loosing rich clients and that of the unknown treatment that may come of the Boys, as the officer puts it, drives the Riders crazy thus the reason to speed even at the expense of their lives.
The account of a prominent Party Promoter, Wayne Anthony, as obtained online recently, also pointed out that ‘No Legislation Will Stop Clubbers From Doing Drugs’ Party promoter, Wayne Anthony, arrived in Ibiza, a Spanish Island in 1988, at the same time as dance music and the party drug ecstasy. Despite hallucinating badly enough to make him give up the lifestyle forever, he says laws will never stop clubbers taking drugs. “I don’t think you can control these things,” said former party promoter Wayne Anthony. He arrived in Ibiza in 1988 and began setting up club nights and raves in some of the island’s most iconic venues. In the years that followed, the sleepy Spanish island turned into a raver’s haven of clubbing and hedonism, with party drugs like ecstasy commonly found. “What Ibiza represented was this beautiful, hot island which was visually stunning and we knew you could party there quite legally,” said Wayne. “You didn’t have to look over your shoulder. You could just be as free as you possibly could be.”
That freedom came with a price. Along with the lavish clubs, all-day-benders and hot Spanish sun came drug cartels and crime. The city transformed into one the world’s most vibrant party capitals, “fuelled by a dangerous and lucrative drugs trade which drew as many criminals to its shores as it did party animals”. Wayne, one of the contributors to the documentary, spoke to Sky News ahead of its release.”I’m not going to sit here and say the cartels aren’t there. They are all there and they’ve been there from the ’90s,” said Wayne. But he said most people tried to ignore the organised crime going on around them. According to Wayne, clubbers usually took the approach of: “‘Give me 10 E’s . Behind the scenes of the filming of Ibiza Narcos with Wayne Anthony. Behind the scenes of the filming of Ibiza Narcos with Wayne Anthony. Hallucinating giant spiders Although he described the Balearic island as the “motherland”, it was eventually a bad experience with drugs that convinced Wayne it was time to leave Ibiza.
He’d been partying for days when he realised he’d taken too many drugs. A friend told him to drink cough medicine, dangerous advice that he now says could have killed him. “I saw the worst hallucination I’ve ever seen in all of my life. I ended up locking myself in the villa with all the shutters down. When he sobered up, he realised he had “come to the end” of his party life on the island. “I never looked back. I never took another drug. I got away from the club world.” ‘I don’t think you’re going to be able to stop it’ Despite his life-changing experience, he doesn’t think criminalising drugs is a good idea – or particularly effective. “If you’re old enough to vote for who’s going to be a world leader, if you’re old enough to put your name down on debt for 25 years, I feel like you should be old enough to govern what you put inside your own body, you know?” said Wayne.
Back to Nigeria, some illicit drugs worth over N30billion seized at Onne Port in Rivers State.
This blood chilling development forced the Federal Government to declare a state of emergency at the Onne Port, following what authorities described as repeated incidents of importation of dangerous cargo, including arms and ammunition through the said port. To this effect, the government said it was immediately implementing emergency protocols at Onne Port for the next three months by conducting thorough examinations of all suspected containers in the premises.
The Comptroller-General of Customs, Bashir Adeniyi, in charge of the port via a press conference, said it henceforth, unveiled the seizures of illicit goods by the Nigeria Customs Service, Area 2 Command, Onne in Eleme Local Government Area of Rivers State. In defence for his action, Adeniyi said the recurring incidents posed a threat to national security, adding that the health of citizens at the Onne Port is increasingly being used as a destination for dangerous and illicit cargo, describing it as a disturbing trend.
The customs boss stated, “Earlier today, I joined numerous stakeholders to take a significant step towards the cause of trade facilitation through the inauguration of upgraded facilities provided by the West Africa Container Terminal, Onne. “As I express delight that trade facilitation is getting traction in Onne Port, I cannot help but call your attention to a grave concern. This has to do with the repeated incidents of national security breaches unfolding in Onne Port. I appreciate your presence, as we all have a shared responsibility in safeguarding our national security. As we are all aware, the policy thrust of Mr President supports the re-energising of our business environment to drive faster import clearance and grow our capacity for exports, Our emphasis has been to promote initiatives that speak to Trade facilitation and economic development. “It is a matter of regret that criminal elements in the international supply chain are exploiting our pro-trade stance to commit atrocities bordering on national security breaches”.
“The attempts to test our will through the importation of dangerous cargo through this port has necessitated the declaration of a state of emergency in Onne Port, coming on the heels of a seizure of a huge cache of arms a couple of months ago. It is disheartening that perpetrators have not backed down on their illegal acts. Recent intelligence and seizures have revealed a disturbing trend; Onne Port is increasingly being used as a destination for dangerous and illicit cargo. The scale and nature of these illegal importations pose a significant threat to our national security and the health of our citizens. Today, we are here to showcase yet another series of significant seizures made by the diligent officers of the Area 2 Command. On display are twelve containers of illicit goods intercepted through a combination of intelligence gathering, inter-agency collaboration, and meticulous physical examination. Seizures on Display include: Three (3) x 40-feet containers: Containing 562,600 bottles of 100ml cough syrup with codeine and 3,150 pieces of chilly cutters, with a Paid Duty Value (DPV) of N4,716,573,846.
“Others are, three x 40-feet containers containing 380,000 bottles of 100ml cough syrup with codeine, 24,480,000 tablets of Royal Tramadol Hydrochloride, 5,350,000 tablets of Tapentadol and Carisoprodol, and other items, with a DPV of N17,432,506,000 were seized”.
According to the report, more seized items were, “Five (5) x 40-feet containers; Containing 892,400 bottles of 100ml cough syrup with codeine, 1,300,000 tablets of 50mg Really Extra Diclofenac, 7,250,000 tablets of 5mg Trodol Benzhexol, and other items, with a DPV of N8, 128,568,295,90. This very action of the Nigeria Customs Service, further complicated the hope of how soon the fight against drug trafficking could be brought to a halt owing to its high profile nature.
Another hair-raising report of the illicit drug deal has it that when NDLEA bursted a Snake-Guarded Shrine Used For Storing Illicit Drugs sometime ago in Edo State. This very news report was published in The Tide Newspaper on June 24, 2024. According to the report, NDLEA said its operatives uncovered a shrine, guarded by a snake, being used for storing illicit drugs, during an operation in Edo State. The Agency in a statement by its spokesperson, Femi Babafemi, added that its operatives discovered a specially constructed large hole in a wall, hidden behind wallpapers and fetish objects used for drug storage. It further noted that methamphetamine, Loud, Colorado and Arizona, all strong strains of cannabis with a total weight of 8.743kg among others, were recovered from the shrine.
To be cont’d
King Onunwor
The persistent clash between farmers and herders in Nigeria has been a longstanding issue. These conflicts, often, over resources like land and water, have led to loss of lives, destruction of property, displacement of large numbers of people, deep-seated mistrust between communities and insecurity. Herders, traditionally nomadic, move their livestock in search of grazing land and water. Farmers, on the other hand, require the same resources for their crops. This competition often leads to clashes, especially in areas where land is becoming increasingly scarce due to population growth, climate change, and environmental degradation. As these clashes intensify, there has been a growing call for sustainable solutions. Two weeks ago, President Bola Tinubu took a bold step towards tackling the issue by inaugurating the Presidential Committee on Implementation of Livestock Reforms and creating the Ministry of Livestock Development.
The committee which has the president as the chairman and the former Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Professor Attahiru Jega as the deputy chairman has the mandate to address obstacles to agricultural productivity and open up new opportunities which benefit farmers, herders, processors, and distributors in the livestock-farming value chain as well as propose recommendations aimed at fostering a peaceful co-existence between herders and farmers, ensuring the security and economic well-being of Nigerians.The establishment of the Ministry of Livestock Development was part of the recommendations of the National Livestock Reforms Committee. Part of the 21 recommendations submitted to the president include: “This agenda should include the establishment and resuscitation of grazing reserves as suggested by many experts and well-meaning Nigerians and other methods of land utilisation.
“Create the Ministry of Livestock Resources in line with practice in many other West African countries. In the alternative, Federal and State Governments should expand the scope of existing Departments of Livestock Production to address the broader needs of the industry,” among others. Experts in the agricultural sector have posited that the livestock industry can create millions of jobs directly in farming, processing, and distribution, and indirectly in related sectors like feed production, veterinary services, and marketing. It provides livelihoods for rural populations, helping to reduce poverty and improve the quality of life in rural areas. It also increases the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and foreign exchange earnings through the exports of livestock and livestock products such as meat, dairy, wool and leather.
According to them, a well-funded livestock industry supports the growth of agro-processing sectors, such as meat packing, dairy processing, and leather manufacturing, adds value to raw products and creates additional economic activity as well as stimulates the development of supply chains, including logistics, packaging, and retail, contributing to broader economic growth. It enhances economic resilience by diversifying the agricultural sector and providing a buffer against crop failures or other agricultural shocks and many more. Some other agriculturists have also opined that the livestock industry in Nigeria is currently underdeveloped and that by the creation of the ministry of livestock development will open up the industry which will be a huge money spinner for Nigeria.
Reports have shown that a Livestock Ministry can play a pivotal role in mitigating conflicts between farmers and herders by implementing policies and programmes aimed at fostering coexistence and sustainable resource management. The Ministry can work towards clearly demarcating grazing routes and farming areas. This would reduce instances of trespassing and accidental crop destruction, a common flashpoint for conflict. While introducing rotational grazing systems can ensure that land is used sustainably, preventing overgrazing and land degradation, establishing water points and boreholes specifically for livestock can reduce competition for water resources. Similarly, promoting the development of pasturelands through reseeding and controlled burns can improve grazing conditions.
According to a veterinary doctor, Dr Andrew Obadiah, by providing training for herders on sustainable livestock practices and for farmers on conflict resolution, both parties can understand the importance of coexistence. He said that extension services of the ministry can offer advice on improving livestock health and productivity, reducing the need for large herds and extensive grazing. “Setting up local committees involving both farmers and herders to mediate disputes can provide a platform for dialogue and peaceful resolution. Encouraging community-based conflict early warning systems can help prevent clashes before they escalate”, he emphasised.For Mrs. Stella Ugwu, a farmer, having a ministry dedicated to the development of the livestock industry can help in diversifying income sources for both farmers and herders and in turn reduce dependence on land.
”For instance, promoting agro-pastoralism can provide farmers with livestock and herders with agricultural produce”, she explained, adding that providing incentives for adopting sustainable practices, such as subsidies for fodder production or crop insurance, can ease economic pressures. Ugwu was however of the opinion that the creation of a new ministry to handle livestock affairs was uncalled for, since the job can effectively be done by the Technical and Service Department of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and food security and its equivalent on the states level.In some countries, the establishment of a Livestock Ministry or similar bodies has shown promising results. For example, Ethiopia’s Ministry of Agriculture includes a dedicated department for livestock which has successfully implemented programmes to improve pastoral livelihoods and reduce conflicts.
In Kenya, the establishment of the National Drought Management Authority has helped manage resources better, thus reducing clashes between herders and farmers during dry seasons.The president of Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), Othman Ngelzarma, sees the Ministry of Livestock Development achieving the same feat for Nigeria in the near future. He told newsmen that, “MACBAN expresses its deepest appreciation to the Federal Government for creating a ministry of livestock to unlock the trillion-naira livestock economy and create qualitative and productive jobs across the value chain to improve the Nigerian economy. With this development, MACBAN believes the hope of the Nigerian pastoralists is now achieved under the Renewed Hope Agenda.
However, the Middle Belt Forum took a different view of the proposed Ministry of Livestock Development, saying it was not enough to sustainably resolve the decades-long farmers-herders crisis in the country. According to the National President of the association, Mr. Bitrus Pogu, what is needed to end the perennial farmers/herders clashes is a deliberate action by regulatory bodies and the government to stop criminal elements from carrying out deadly attacks on innocent Nigerians, mainly farmers. Hear him: “If the reason for creating the Ministry is to stop clashes, I think it is wrong because all of these attacks and killings that are happening have nothing to do with conflicts between farmers and herders. “Farmers have never connived at any given time to go and attack herders, but rather, criminals who happen to be Fulani gang up and attack farmers, kill, maim and chase them out of their ancestral homes.
“Then, the Fulani will come and occupy them. So, it is more about invasion, criminality, and terrorism. And the majority of those they hire to do these evils are not even those who have cattle. So, a deliberate action has to be taken by the government against the perpetrators, which will address the criminality.” Mr. Pogu suggested that the government should adopt ranching for productivity and enduring peace between the pastoralists and farmers in particular and the entire country in general.While the establishment of a Livestock Ministry presents a viable solution, it is not without challenges. Funding constraints, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and corruption can hamper its effectiveness. Additionally, deeply ingrained cultural practices and mistrust between farmers and herders can be difficult to overcome.
Critics argue that without a holistic approach that includes land reform, climate change adaptation, and broader economic development, a Livestock Ministry alone may not be sufficient. Therefore, it must work in tandem with other governmental and non-governmental bodies to ensure comprehensive solutions. “A dedicated Livestock Ministry, with its focus on sustainable resource management, conflict resolution, and economic incentives, offers a promising avenue to address the root causes of these clashes. However, its success depends on effective implementation, adequate funding, and the cooperation of all stakeholders involved. With the right strategies and commitment, devoid of any political or selfish interest, it can play a crucial role in fostering peace and prosperity in affected regions”, they advised.
Calista Ezeaku
